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REVENUE RULING 84-132: SIDELINED, BUT NOT
FORGOTTEN
Nina R. Murphy*
I

INTRODUCTION4

Virtually all colleges and universities have scholarship programs
designed to support their athletic teams.1 The programs are generally in the form of membership clubs 2 which are tax-exempt under
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and therefore eligible to receive donations which provide tax deductions to their patrons.3 The fact that an organization is an "eligible receiver," however, does not ensure that all payments to it are deductible.4 For
example, the cost of football tickets is not deductible since the
purchaser is receiving value for his payment. 5
Most alumni have pressure exerted on them to support their
team by joining the university's athletic scholarship program. As
an inducement, a majority of these programs offer preferential
seating at football or basketball games as a benefit of club
7
membership.
*

Professor of Law, T. C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.A., 1969,

Hunter College; J.D., 1972, New York University;, L.L.M., 1976, New York University. The
author expresses appreciation for research assistance to Joan E. Putney and Michele Nieroda, both in the T. C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond, class of 1985.
1. Letter from Sheldon Elliot Steinbach on behalf of American Council on Education,
Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities, National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education, National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities,
National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges submitted to Associate
Chief Counsel (Technical), Internal Revenue Service (Dec. 17, 1984).
2. See, e.g., University of Florida 1985 Ticket Information Brochure 3 ("Gator Boosters,
Inc., exists for the purpose of elevating the quality of Florida's athletes through charitable
contributions.").
3. See LR.C. § 170 (All citations are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended).
4. Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104; IRS Publication 526, 2 IRS PuBLICATIONS (CCH)
22,451 (revised Nov. 1984).
5. Ryan v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 1120, 1122 (1969).
6. See, e.g., University of Florida, 1985 Ticket Information Brochure 3 ("Gator Boosters
is made up of friends of the University of Florida who believe a strong program of intercollegiate athletics can increase Florida's national visibility while enhancing individual character and university spirit.").
7. Statement of John L. Toner, President, National Collegiate Athletic Association to the
Internal Revenue Service on the Implications of Revenue Ruling 84-132, Jan. 7, 1985, re-
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Recently, the Commissioner, applying the rule of quid pro quo
to these clubs, issued Revenue Ruling 84-132.1 The ruling holds
that, if preferential seating is the only benefit of membership, no
new members are admitted unless preferred seats are available,
and there is a waiting list for membership, then there is no deduction since the value of the benefit received is equal to the amount
paid.9
Colleges and universities nationwide, fearing loss of support for
their athletic programs because of the ruling, protested to both the
Internal Revenue Service and Congress.1 ° As a result of this protest, the ruling has been temporarily suspended.1 1
This article will briefly discuss the background of deductibility
of charitable contributions. Revenue Ruling 84-132 is then analyzed
with reference to the established rules regarding the deductibility
of charitable contributions outside the context of alumni contributions.' 2 Using these existing rules, a recommendation for determining the deductibility of alumni contributions is discussed.

II.

BACKGROUND

A contribution or gift to or for the use of a charity is defined as a
voluntary transfer of money or property without receipt or expectation of a financial or economic benefit. 13 Such contribution is deductible by the donor in the year paid, 4 subject to percentage limitations based on the donor's adjusted gross income.26 Colleges
and universities are organizations eligible to receive
contributions. 7
porting on the results of an NCAA survey of its member schools that 77% of the schools
responding had preferential seating as a benefit of membership.
8. Rev. Rul. 84-132, 1984-36 I.R.B. 5.
9. Id. at 6.
10. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
11. I.R. 84-111 (Oct. 19, 1984), reported in DAILY TAX RFP. [BNA] No. 204, at E-4 (Oct.
22, 1984).
12. See infra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(5); H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A44 (1954); S.
REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 196 (1954).

14. I.R.C. § 170(a).
15. Id § 170(b).
16. Id. § 170(b)(1)(f). Taxpayer's contribution base as defined by the I.R.C. is adjusted
gross income with the parenthetical that such adjusted gross income is computed without
regard to any net operating loss carryback.

17. Id. § 170(c)(2)(B).
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The fact that a charity uses the money or property it receives for
charitable purposes does not guarantee the donor a charitable contribution deduction.1 8
The Commissioner has established in a series of cases that the
donor's anticipated benefit, if any, controls whether a gift has been
made. In the first of these cases, Channing v. United States,"e the
Commissioner indicated that a payment to a charity would be
closely scrutinized to determine if the taxpayer receives a benefit.
In Channing, the taxpayer attempted to deduct the tuition costs
for sending the taxpayer's children to parochial school.2 0 The taxpayer argued that this tuition was a "contribution" to a charitable
organization. The district court rejected the taxpayer's arguments
and concluded that, in light of the legislative history of the charitable deduction section,2 1 the term "contribution" was intended to
be synonymous with "gift." 22
Thirty years later, the Tax Court was confronted with a similar
argument for deductibility of parochial school tuition. In De Jong
23 a taxpayer attempted to deduct the full tuition
v. Commissioner,
"contribution" for his children, pointing to the fact that the school
considered such contributions entirely voluntary. 24 The Commissioner argued that the court should follow an objective test which
would allow the De Jongs to deduct only that portion of their tuition payments which exceeded the actual educational costs per pupil, an amount stipulated to by both parties. 2 5 The Tax Court rejected both arguments, applying instead, a subjective test: "if a
payment proceeds primarily from the incentive of anticipated benefit to the payer beyond the satisfaction which flows from the per18. Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104. For a thorough discussion of the history of charitable contributions, see Hobbet, Charitable Contributions-HowCharitableMust They Be?,
11 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1970).
19. 4 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 67 F.2d 986 (1st Cir. 1933), cert. denied,
291 U.S. 686 (1934).
20. Channing, 4 F. Supp. at 34.
21. Channing actually discussed section 23(n)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1928. This section
was the predecessor to the present section 170.
22. Channing, 4 F. Supp. at 34.
23. 36 T.C. 896 (1958), aff'd, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
24. The amount the school requested as contributions from the parents of its students
was based on the education society's estimation of education costs per pupil and the parents' ability to pay. Although the school derived its primary support from parents' contributions, children were admitted to the school without regard to how much was contributed. De
Jong, 309 F.2d at 374-79.
25. Id., 36 T.C. at 900.
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formance of a generous act, it is not a gift. '28 The Tax Court's
opinion was later affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals."
Since De Jong, the courts have indicated their dissatisfaction
with the subjective test. In a case involving the deductibility of
tuition to a parochial school, Haak v. United States, the district
court stated in a footnote that "[tjo distinguish those members
whose contribution is based upon a bona fide belief in tithing from
those who contribute for other reasons would be a nearly impossible task. '2 8 Even before Haak, the Commissioner announced that
.the donor's state of mind when transferring money or other property to a charitable organization is not relevant in deciding if a
contribution has been made.29
The only recent case that has suggested examining each donor's
motive and individual situation is American Bar Endowment
(ABE) v. United States.30 In ABE, the court analyzed one of
ABE's fundraising projects, an insurance program which was structured so that all premium refunds were assigned to ABE by the
members. The members attempted to deduct the percent of their
premiums refunded to ABE by the underwriting insurance companies, arguing that the insurance payment had a dual purpose, i.e.,
3
part insurance premium, part donation1.
According to the Commissioner, to establish a dual payment the taxpayer must demonstrate that he bought goods or services for more than their economic value, with the intention that the excess be used to benefit a
charitable enterprise.2 The Claims Court concluded that, taking
into account all the facts and circumstances, an insurance purchase
through the Endowment plan may be a good deal for some but not
for others, thereby necessitating a separate inquiry into each member's motivation and circumstances. 3 The court then performs the
"impossible task" 34 of making a separate determination for each
individual insurance purchaser.
26. Id. at 899.
27. 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
28. Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 n.5 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
29. Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 105.
30. 4 Cl. Ct. 404, 84-1 U.S.T.C. 9204 (1984).
31. For a discussion of the basis of this "dual purpose" argument, see infra note 45 and
accompanying text.
32. See Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 105.
33. See B. BrrIKER, FEDERAL TAXATION Op INCOME, ESTATE & GIFrs 83,257 (1981).
34. See Haak, 451 F. Supp. at 1092 n. 5. There were only four individuals involved in the
ABE case; there are 55,000 members of the ABE who are enrolled in the insurance plan.

1985]

REVENUE RULING 84-132

ABE clearly is not supported by the present state of the law, and
even if the donor can prove a charitable intent, there is still no
contribution if a benefit is, in fact, received.3 5 As indicated by the
First Circuit Court of Appeals: "Were the deductibility of a contribution under section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to
depend on [subjective intent], an important area of tax law would
become a mare's nest of uncertainty woven of judicial value judgments irrelevant to eleemosynary realities."3 6
Courts that have rejected the subjective test for determining
whether a donation constituted a gift have instead focused on benefits received by the donor because of the contribution. In Oppewal v. Commissioner,37 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
focused, not on the donative intent of the taxpayer, but on the
quid pro quo the taxpayer received, stating that:
However the payment was designated, and whatever motives the
taxpayer had in making it, was it to any substantial extent, offset by
the cost of services rendered to the taxpayers in the nature of tuition? If so, the payment, to the extent of the offset, should be regarded as tuition ... .38
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted a similar objective test in Winters v. Commissioner.9
In 1979, the Commissioner attempted to apply the logic and reasoning of those courts adopting the objective quid pro quo test by
issuing Revenue Ruling 79-99.40 In this Ruling, the Commissioner
held that even if payments to a parochial school were voluntary
and were credited to a general fund rather than for a specific stu35. Technical Information Release-747 (June 30, 1965), cited in J.

MERTENS, LAW OF

FED-

ERAL INCOiE TAXATION 1961-1965 Rulings M.A.P. 376, 378 (1966) ("The Revenue Service

emphasized . . .that the mere fact that tickets or other privileges are not used does not
entitle the patron to any greater charitable contribution deduction. The test of deductibility
is not whether the right to admission is exercised, but whether the right was available.").
Many taxpayers lose a charitable deduction by showing an unused ticket to justify the deduction, B. BrrrKER, supra note 33, 35.1.3, at 35-10. See also Rev. Rul. 74-348, 1974-2 C.B.
80 (donor returning $5.00 ticket, purchased for $3.00, as part of a series to the charity to
resell entitled to a $3.00 deduction under § 170(e)(1)(A)).
36. Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146, 146 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 976 (1967).
37. 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1177 (1971), af'd, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972).
38. Id., 468 F.2d at 1002.
39. 468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972).
40. Rev. Rul. 79-99, 1979-1 C.B. 108.
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dent's tuition, the payments could not be deducted.4 '
Congress reacted quickly to this overly general ruling by passing
a law which denied funds for the enforcement of any revenue ruling which held that a "taxpayer is not entitled to a charitable deduction for general purpose contributions which are used for educational purposes by [an exempt] religious organization.

'42

The

Commissioner responded with Revenue Ruling 83-104 which outlined situations where a transfer of money made by a parent to a
school organization would be deductible. Under the Ruling, the deductibility of the transfer depends upon whether the payment is
voluntary and made without expectation of receiving a commensurate benefit in return. The payment will not be deductible if the
facts and circumstances of the case indicate that enrollment in the
school was, in any way, contingent upon making the payment. In
addition, there can be no plan, express or implied, to convert nondeductible tuition into charitable contributions, and the benefit received by the contributing parents cannot otherwise depend upon
the making of the payment.43
Once it is determined that a benefit has been received by a donor of a charitable organization, the issue becomes how to value
that benefit. 44 A payment to a charity may have a dual charac-

ter-part purchase price, part contribution.4 5 By use of twelve examples, the Commissioner, in Revenue Ruling 67-246 4 describes
the types of benefits which are deemed to have monetary value to
the donor and thus will reduce the contribution part of a payment.
The burden is placed on the donor to value the benefits received.
In the absence of a showing to the contrary, the Commissioner will
assume that the benefit received is equal to the amount paid.47
When the taxpayer assesses the value of a benefit received, the
correct measure is fair market value. 48 This figure is not difficult to
41. Id. at 109.
42. Pub. L. No. 96-74, 96th Cong., H.R. 4393 (Sept. 29, 1979).
43. Rev. Rul. 83-104, 1983-2 C.B. 46, 46-48.
44. In Technical Information Release-747, issued in 1965, the Internal Revenue Service,
while attempting to have the charities value what they are giving a donor in return for a
contribution, put the burden of valuing the benefit on the donor.
45. See American Bar Endowment v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 404, 84-1 U.S.T.C. 5 9204
(1984); Singer v. United States, 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
46. Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104.

47. Id.

§

48. Rev. Rul. 78-189, 1978-1 C.B. 68. Fair market value is defined in Treasury Regulation
1.170A -1(c)(2) as "the price at which the property would change hands between a willing
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determine if there is an established market for the benefit received.49 When there is no established market, however, the issue
of assessment becomes more difficult. In those cases where no market exists for the benefit received, the Commissioner requires a
"reasonable estimate of the fair market value" to be made by the
taxpayer.5 0 The deductibility of the contribution must be reduced
by this estimated amount.
The Commissioner has looked to the donee-charitable organization for help in valuing the benefit a donor.receives. In a 1967 Revenue Ruling, the Commissioner suggested that these recipients of
charitable contributions-in exchange for benefits such as tickets,
meals or mementos-advise the donor of the fair market value of
the item received. 5 1This has never been made a requirement, however, and the burden of valuing the benefit still remains upon the
donor. In fact, the donor cannot even rely upon statements made
by the charitable organization regarding the deductibility of his
contribution, unless an amount
reasonably setting the benefit's fair
52
market value is provided.

buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both hav-

ing a reasonable knowledge of relevant facts."
49. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104. See also Rev. Rul. 82-201, 1982-2 C.B. 5

(holding that purchasing of a book sold by the local committee of a national political party
at a price greater than its fair market value entitles the buyer to a political contribution
credit equal to the difference between the price paid for the book and its fair market value).
50. See Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 106. Technical Information Release-747 (June
30, 1965); Pvt. Ltr. Rul. No. 8229113, 1982 P-H FED. TAXEs-PRIVATE LTm RUL. 1 4020(82).
In the private letter ruling, a tax-exempt organization, in order to raise money to build a
bronze statue of a longhorn steer and a mounted brand inspector of the 1880's, will distribute miniature bronze statuettes and brochures to persons who pay X dollars to the project. The Commissioner determined that donors will be allowed a charitable deduction only
to the extent that the amount of money transferred can be shown to exceed the fair market
value of the miniature bronze statue and the brochure. The burden is on the donor to establish that the amount paid is not the purchase price of the brochure and statue and that part
of the payment in fact qualifies as a gift. The cost of the statuette to the organization does
not establish fair market value.
51. See Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 106.
52. The Commissioner expressed concern in Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104 that there
are an increasing number of instances where taxpayers are erroneously advised by the charities as to deductibility of their payments. There is no suggestion whether this is intentional
or not. See, e.g., Plainfield Hails Home Grown Talent, Plainfield Today, Aug. 9, 1984, at 9;
col. 1-2 (Plainfield, N.J.) (Tickets for a local talent show to benefit the YWCA are announced with a statement in the article that "all ticket purchases are tax-deductable [sic],
according to the committee planning the evening."); India Festive Feasting,Crafts, Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 8, 1984 at H-14, col 3-4. (Richmond, Va.) (announcing that a
bazaar sponsored by the Hindu Center of Virginia would offer an authentic Indian meal at a
cost of $6.00; article noted that "[tihe meal ticket is a tax-deductible donation, according to
the festival's organizers.").
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Valuation is particularly speculative when the benefit received is
simply a memento acknowledging the gift. Nonetheless, the Commissioner will not allow the fair market value of the memento to
be deducted as part of the charitable contribution. 3 The burden of
valuation placed upon the donor is even more difficult and speculative when the benefit given in exchange for the contribution is an
intangible-such as a preferred seating privilege. 4 Receipt of just
such an intangible was the situation addressed by the Commissioner in Revenue Ruling 84-132." 5

III.

THE RULING

In Revenue Ruling 84-132, the Commissioner presents a situation in which an individual made a payment of $300 to a university's athletic scholarship program thereby becoming a "member"
of the program. The only benefit of membership is the privilege
(for an additional $120) of purchasing a season's ticket to the university's home football games with preferred seating between the
40-yard lines. No tickets for such seats are available to non-members. A person is made a member only when a season's ticket between the 40-yard lines becomes available. There are approxi56
mately 2,000 people on the waiting list to become members.
In the facts of this ruling, the Commissioner has drawn the
tightest possible case for holding that the full amount of the membership fee is paid in exchange for the privilege of purchasing preferred seats. The ruling held that a taxpayer could not deduct any
part of the membership fee under section 170 unless he could establish that the payment exceeds the monetary value of the right
to purchase preferred seats. According to the Commission, "fair
market value of the privilege of having choice reserved seats ...
Some charities take the hedging approach-while not stating that the full amount of the
payment is deductible, they give no indication that it is not. See, e.g., Decision 84: Pledge
and Information (Radio station WRFK-FM's annual solicitation brochure where gifts vary
with contribution level clearly falling within Example 4 of Rev. Rul.67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104,
108; the statement appears: "Remember that all contributions to WRFK are tax-deductible,
as allowed by the IRS.") (emphasis added).
53. See Pvt Ltr. Rul. No. 8229113, 1982 P-H FED. TAXES-PRIVATE LT RuL. 4020(82).
For a discussion of how one might value these mementos for purposes of determining deductibility of contributions, see infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
54. There has never been any suggestion that the price paid for the tickets themselves is
deductible; it is only the right to buy those tickets that is at issue in Revenue Ruling 84-132.
55. Rev. Rul. 84-132, 1984-36 I.R.B. 5.
56. Id.
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would in all likelihood, exceed the amount of payment.

57

The result reached in the Revenue Ruling is an accurate reflection of the law as it currently exists. "The fundamental principle
. . . remains unchanged, if the payment brings the payor some

benefit, it's not deductible."5' 8
The reaction to Revenue Ruling 84-132 by the colleges, and ultimately by Congress, was immediate.59 The pressure led to a temporary suspension of the ruling6 0 and the unusual procedure of the
scheduling of a public hearing on the revenue ruling."' The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), through its President, John L. Toner, expressed fear that "as written, the Ruling
will lead to enormous confusion and ultimately to serious erosion
in our members' fund-raising capacities. '6 2 Toner does not dispute
the fact that some benefits should be valued," but requests the
permanent withdrawal of the Ruling to avoid a chilling effect on
contributions to athletic scholarship programs."
57. Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104) (emphasis added). The Commissioner
also cites Rev. Rul. 76-185, 1976-1 C.B. 222. Reliance on that ruling, in which taxpayer
restored a historic mansion in exchange for the right to live there for 15 years, seems misplaced, as a fair rental value should not be difficult to compute.
58. Prepared Statement of Professor Richard L. Kaplan, College of Law, University of
Illinois, before the Internal Revenue Service, Washington, D.C. (January 7, 1985).
59. The ruling was issued September 4, 1984. Senate Finance Committee Chairman Robert Dole (R-Kan.), after being lobbied by other members, announced on the Senate floor on
Oct. 11, 1984, that the Treasury Department was committed to withdrawing the ruling until
after a public hearing. Rep. Norman Dicks (D-Wash.) introduced H. R. 6389 to repeal the
revenue ruling.
60. I.R.B. 84-111 (Oct. 19, 1984), cited in DAILY TAX RE p. (BNA) No. 204, at G-4 (Oct. 22,
1984) (stating that the ruling was suspended until "its implications upon the varied athletic
scholarship programs in existence throughout the country" are determined).
61. The hearing is the second in IRS history to be held on a revenue ruling or procedure.
DAmy TAx REP. (BNA) No. 5, at G-5 (Jan. 7, 1985).
62. Statement of John L. Toner, President, National Collegiate Athletic Association to
the Internal Revenue Service on the Implications of Revenue Ruling 84-132, at 5 (January 7,
1985). Evidence of this confusion can be seen in letters to Senator Mark Hatfield, characterizing the ruling as disallowing tax deductions for athletic contributions. Letter from Bill
Byrne, University of Oregon's Director of Athletics, to Senator Mark Hatfield (Oct. 22,
1984); Letter from Bob Herndon, Executive Director of the Beaver Club, to Senator Mark
Hatfield (Oct. 16, 1984) (stating that the Beaver Club supports the Oregon State University's Athletic Department).
63. See Statement of John L. Toner, supra note 62, at 4 (suggesting benefits such as
reduced ticket prices or free parking).
64. See Legislative History, Tax Reform Act 1969 Section 170 [2 Series 1-Primary
Sources] Tax MGMT (BNA) 170.39, stating that
[I]n addition to the economic motivations for charitable giving, the American Association of Fund-Raising Counsel recognized many non-economic incentives for giving.
These include responses to social awareness, generosity, social pressure, pity, and
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IV. RECOMMENDATION
Revenue Ruling 84-132 must be reissued in a revised format. Apparently, the Ruling was issued without a thorough knowledge of
the package of benefits generally offered by athletic scholarship
programs.6 5 The reissued ruling must take account of the variations in these programs throughout the country. 66 A proposed format would combine the approaches used in other charitable contribution rulings: Revenue Rulings 67-246,67 68-4328a and 83-104.e9
Revenue Ruling 67-246, by means of twelve examples, illustrates
typical fund-raising techniques used by charities in soliciting donations and advises the taxpayer/donor of the tax consequences of
receiving benefits offered by the charities in return for "donations." For example, if a charity sponsors a concert and the "donation" per ticket approximates the established admission charge for
this type of concert, there is no gift and no tax-deductible contribution.70 If the taxpayer pays more than the established admission
charge for similar tickets, then only the excess is deductible. 1 In
another example, a symphony, in order to support free public concerts, solicits contributions from its patrons. As an inducement, the
symphony offers free admission to the premiere showing of a motion picture and choice reserved seats to the public concerts for a
$20 membership fee. No part of the membership fee is deductible,
even if the contributor does not wish to attend the premiere showing of the film. "[U]nder these circumstances the fair market value
of the privilege of having choice reserved seats for attending the
concerts would, in all likelihood, exceed the amount of the payhabit. To the extent that non-economic factors influence charitable giving patterns,

changes in the tax treatment of charitable donations have little repercussion on level
of contributions." These non-economic factors, largely nonquantifiable, have a strong
influence.

65. Letter from Sheldon Elliot Steinbach, supra note 1.
66. See Survey Summary of Results of NCAA Division I Institutions Regarding IRS
Charitable ContributionRuling [hereinafter cited as Survey Results]; statement of John L.
Toner, supra note 62.
Charles M. Morgan III, Associate Chief Counsel (Technical), Internal Revenue Service,
said at the conclusion of the hearings that additional information about the workings of
college sports programs would aid the agency in reconsidering its ruling. DAILY TAX RFm.
(BNA) No. 5, at G5 (Jan. 8, 1985).
67. 1967-2 C.B. 104.
68. 1968-2 C.B. 104.
69. 1983-2 C.B. 46.
70. 1967-2 C.B. at 107, ex 1.
71. Id. at 107-08, ex. 2.
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ment. ' 72 Other examples in the Ruling cover charity bazaars,7 3
charity luncheons7 4 and balls, 75 and charity catalogues offering various merchandise depending on contribution level. 76 In each instance, the Commissioner analyzes the facts and circumstances and
applies to each situation the law of charitable contributions discussed above.
In Revenue Ruling 68-432, the Commissioner analyzes the deductibility of contributions for various museum memberships. The
Commissioner compared the various benefits and contributions for
each category of membership in distinguishing those groups which
were receiving a non-deductible quid pro quo for their payments
from those groups *hich were clearly making a charitable contribution. Since all members received equal benefits to a certain extent, the minimum amount for any membership was determined to
77
be equal to the benefits received and, therefore, non-deductible.
In those instances where the monetary contributions greatly exceeded the value of the benefits received, the Commissioner indicated that it would treat the contribution as of a "dual character
. . . [and] give due consideration to the possible separation on a
uniform basis of that portion of the total payment that may prop7T
erly be treated as a charitable contribution.
Revenue Ruling 83-104, issued in response to the congressional
reaction precipitated by Revenue Ruling 79-99,79 takes into account the various ways parochial schools handle their fund raising
and admission programs. For example, if the private school requests from parents a set "contribution," and if parents do not
make this contribution they are charged tuition equalling the same
amount, no portion of the payment may be deducted as a charitable contribution. 0 Similarly, if contributions are solicited as part
of the admission process but the private school does not charge
tuition, no deduction will be allowed to the extent of the per pupil
cost.8 1 By contrast, if a church operates a school as only one of its
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 109-10, ex. 7.
Id. ex. 9.
Id. at 108-09, ex. 6.
Id. at 111, ex. 12.
Id. at 108, ex. 4.
1968-2 C.B. at 105.

78. Id.
79. See discussion supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
80. Rev. Rul. 83-104, 1983-2 C.B. at 48, ex. 1.
81. Id. ex. 2.

312

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:301

activities, receives contributions from all its members which are
placed in the general fund to support all church activities, and solicits contributions from church members with children in the
school with the same methods as members without children, then a
deduction by parents will be allowed.2
A reissued Revenue Ruling 84-132 must give examples of the
more common scholarship charitable contributions." Most schools
offer a package of benefits comparable to one or more of the situations in Revenue Rulings 67-246, 68-432, and 83-104. Preferred
seating, as in Revenue Ruling 67-246, example 4, is only one instance. There are usually pre and post game parties, monthly
newsletters, meetings with coaches, name in the program, free
parking, et cetera, depending on various contribution levels. s4
Apparently most schools are not in the enviable position of the
hypothetical university in Revenue Ruling 84-132, having a waiting
list to buy season's tickets.8 5 A study of the hundreds of letters
submitted to the Technical Division of the Internal Revenue Service in response to this ruling presents a picture of the situation at
both large and small colleges and evidences a fear that, if allowed
to stand, the ruling will cost the colleges a significant amount of
money. On the other side, if the ruling is completely withdrawn,
some colleges will continue to abuse the section 170 charitable contribution by offering their patrons significantly more benefits than
just preferred seating in exchange for a tax deductible
8 7
contribution.
82. Id. ex. 4.
83. See generally Letter from David A. Sachs and Joseph B. Whitebread, Jr., representing the Maryland Educational Foundation, Inc., to Charles M. Morgan IlI, Associate Chief
Counsel (Technical), Internal Revenue Service 3 (Dec. 14, 1984) (stating that "Rev. Rul. 84132 does not represent normative fund-raising programs sponsored by universities"); see
also Statement from John L. Toner, supra note 7.
The NCAA survey submitted by Toner would be an ideal starting place, but obviously
any final result should not be formulated until input is received from many sources-for
example, the American Council on Education. Letter from Sheldon Steinbach, General
Counsel, American Council on Education to Charles M. Morgan III, Associate Chief Counsel
(Technical), Internal Revenue Service (Dec. 17, 1984).
84. See, e.g., University of Florida 1985 Ticket Information Brochure 4.
85. Survey Results, supra note 66 (Of schools that offered preferred seating, only 17%
had a waiting list).

86. Mr. Roscoe Egger, Jr., a Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, and Charles
M. Morgan III, Associate Chief Counsel (Technical) for the Internal Revenue Service re-

ceived over 50 letters to this effect. Copies of these letters are on file with the author.
87. An example of this type of abuse is found in the Bull Gator Club at the University of

Florida. For a donation of $10,000 per year, members receive 1) official Blazer and Bull
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In following the formats of Revenue Rulings 67-246, 68-432 and
83-104, the Commissioner, after studying the athletic scholarship
program formats around the country, can set up general principles
for deductibility-for example, benefits such as free parking and
preferred seating privileges must be valued and that value subtracted from the membership fee while one's name in a program or
on a plaque memorializing the contribution would not reduce the
deductibility of the membership fee.88 Once general principles have
been outlined, a number of typical fund-raising programs should
be described with a full analysis of the tax consequences of each.
In addition, the Commissioner should list factors to be considered
in determining deductibility of contributions to a program which is
a hybrid of the ones described.8 9 A study of the three rulings mentioned will make it obvious that the Commissioner need make no
new law; what is required is the marshalling of those factors which
are applicable to athletic scholarship programs in one revenue
ruling.
A crucial element of a reissued revenue ruling is a section on
valuation of benefits received9" and a requirement that the colleges
inform their supporters of the deductible portion of any payment.9 1 When the benefit received is merely a memento, a de minimus rule would be proper. This approach is now used by the Commissioner to prevent an ordinary income tax upon a tax-exempt
gator patch, 2) official plaque, 3) Bull gator pin, 4) official Bull gator ring, 5) four seats in

Florida field press box, 6) reserved name parking for football games, 7) pre-and post-football game parties, 8) subscription to "'Gator Tabs" newspaper, 9) membership card-free ad-

mission to all events except football and basketball, 10) football and basketball brochures,
11) picture in football, basketball programs, 12) window decals, 13) golf course membership,

14) Gator Auto Tag, 15) right to purchase 4 tickets to Florida Field, 16) right to purchase 20
Georgia tickets, 17) right to purchase 10 FSU tickets, 18) right to purchase 10 priority basketball and 10 priority SEC basketball tournament tickets and 19) tax deduction. Univer-

sity of Florida 1985 Ticket Information Brochure 4 (emphasis added).
88. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (discussing a de minimus rule in these

circumstances).
89. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 83-104, 1983-2 C.B. at 47:
[T]he presence of one or more of the following factors creates a presumption that the

payment is not a charitable contribution: the existence of a contract under which a
taxpayer agrees to make a 'contribution' and which contains provisions ensuring the
admission of taxpayer's child; a plan allowing taxpayer either to pay tuition or to
make 'contributions' in exchange for schooling; the earmarking of a contribution for

the direct benefit of a particular individual; or the otherwise-unexplained denial of
admission or readinission to a school of children of taxpayers who are financially able

but who do not contribute.
90. For a discussion of the difficulties of valuing benefits without an established market,
see supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
91. See Technical Information Release-747 (June 30, 1965).
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organization which distributes "low cost articles" to all contributors.92 Without a de minimus rule, the tax-exempt organization
may be treated as selling the mementos for profit. Similarly, in the
context of unrelated business taxable income, a de minimus rule
has been applied. When adopting the sections dealing with unrelated business taxable income, the legislature indicated that "the
amounts received [by the charitable organization] are not to be
considered as being in exchange for the low cost articles where it is
clear that the contributions, less a reasonable administrative cost,
fully accrue to the exempt organization."" A similar rationale
should apply here.
When valuing intangible privileges, it is necessary for the Commissioner to provide the colleges some valuation techniques.9 4 In
addition, donors need a direct statement from the colleges so there
is no longer a misunderstanding regarding what portion of a contribution is deductible and what is payment for goods or services
received. 5
V.

CONCLUSION

By applying the law of charitable contributions to college football programs, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has created a
nationwide controversy. Rather than just withdrawing the ruling,
the Commissioner must issue an expanded ruling so that college
athletic programs will not consider themselves immune to the law
as it applies to all other charitable institutions. The only way to
put teeth in an expanded ruling is to require the college to put its
patrons on notice as to what portion of any payment is a contribution. The fear that contributions will be reduced if the total
amount paid is not deductible is not relevant unless one feels it
necessary to rewrite the law of charitable contributions for supporters of college football teams.
92. See Tress. Reg. § 1.513-1(b).
93. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 2027, 2100. While a full discussion of this suggestion is beyond the scope of this paper, a thorough discussion of the reason for the exemption can be found in Hope School v.
United States, 612 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1980).
94. Farris Womack, Vice Chancellor of the University of North Carolina, representing the
American Council of Education at the public hearing on Revenue Ruling 84-132, stated that
guidance was needed from the IRS on how to calculate the value of benefits when there was
no established marketplace for such benefits. See DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 5, at G5 (Jan.

8, 1985).
95. See Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. at 107-11.

1985]

REVENUE RULING 84-132

315

ADDENDUM
American Bar Endowment v. United States1 was reversed in relevant part by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on
May 10, 1985.2 That court found that the Claims Court applied the
wrong test. After a lengthy explanation, the court held that "the
general question to be posed . . .is whether the transaction between the Endowment and the taxpayers involving the assignment
of dividends 'was of a business nature and not charitable.' ,,3
Although the test has changed, the court still requires the impossible
task of making the business-charitable determination on an individual basis for each policyholder.

1. 4 Ct. Cl. 404, 84-1 U.S. TAX CAs. (CCH) 9204 (1984); see text accompanying notes 304.
2. No. 84-988 DAiLY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 99, at H-1 (May 22, 1985).
3. Id. at H-4 (citing Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 424 (Ct. Cl. 1971)).

